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Tiny perturbations may trigger large responses in systems near criticality, shifting them across
equilibria. Committed minorities are suggested to be responsible for the emergence of collective
behaviors in many physical, social, and biological systems. Using evolutionary game theory, we
address the question whether a finite fraction of zealots can drive the system to large-scale coordi-
nation. We find that a tipping point exists in coordination games, whereas the same phenomenon
depends on the selection pressure, update rule, and network structure in other types of games. Our
study paves the way to understand social systems driven by the individuals’ benefit in presence of
zealots, such as human vaccination behavior or cooperative transports in animal groups.
I. INTRODUCTION
One hallmark of complex systems at the critical point
is that small perturbations may trigger large responses,
shifting the system from one equilibrium to another [1–
6]. Small perturbations can be responsible for the emer-
gence/disruption of collective phenomena such as syn-
chronization [7, 8], active Brownian motion (flocking)
[9], and cultural evolution [10, 11]. One way to model
perturbations is to assume the existence of a committed
minority, whose fluctuations may trigger a system-wide
response. Committed minorities also play a pivotal role
in the emergence of consensus among opinions and in co-
ordination problems [12, 13]. Over the time, committed
minorities have spurred a cascade of behavioral changes
leading to a shift in the conventions held by the majority
of the population (e.g., civil rights movements [14], riots
and revolutions [15, 16], and vaccine hesitancy [17]).
We refer to a committed individual, i.e., having strong
beliefs about something, as a zealot. Zealotry can elicit
consensus in human/animal behavior [18–20], the po-
larization of opinions in the voter model [21], major-
ity rule [13], naming game [22–24], social knowledge
strucure (SKS) [25], and cooperative decision making
model (CDMM) [26] models. Zealotry can also drive
the emergence of cooperation in evolutionary games [27–
29], and the attainment of the optimal equilibrium in
the Schelling’s model of social segregation dynamics [30].
Conversely, zealous (i.e., stubborn) dissenters can dis-
rupt flocking in the Vicsek’s active matter model [9].
Lastly, including zealots of opposite types hinders opin-
ions’ polarization in the voter model [31] and majority
rule [13]. One question about zealots is whether or not
their catalytic role in migrating the system across equilib-
ria requires a critical mass. Specifically, an infinitesimal
∗ naokimas@buffalo.edu
fraction of zealots is enough to shift the equilibria in the
voter [21], CDMM [26], and Schelling’s [30] dynamics,
whereas finite fractions are needed in both the majority
rule [13] and Vicsek [9] dynamics, as well as in the naming
game theoretically [22, 24] and experimentally [32].
In this paper, we clarify the presence of critical mass
effects induced by zealots by providing a comprehensive
study based on evolutionary game theory. We exam-
ine the conditions under which a critical mass of zealots
enabling the consensus of one opinion state, which one
often identifies with cooperation in the context of social
dilemma games, exists. We extend the results for well-
mixed populations presented in Refs. [27, 29] by con-
sidering a wider class of games, distinct update rules,
and making a thorough analysis of the effects of selec-
tion pressure on the critical mass effect. We provide a
wider overview on the overall phenomenology and a con-
nection with analogous phenomena observed in opinion
dynamics. Contrary to the assumption made in Ref. [28],
our zealous agents contribute to the payoff of any agent,
regardless of its opinion state. We also consider the case
of networks of agents and investigate the role of network
structure on the appearance of the critical mass effect.
II. MODEL
Let us consider a well-mixed population of N agents
playing an evolutionary two-strategy game. The state of
an agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is determined by its strategy,
si, which we refer to as either cooperation (si = C) or
defection (si = D). The entries of the payoff matrix,
A = (aij), correspond to the payoff gained by the row
agent and fully characterize the game. A subclass of all
the possible 2 × 2 payoff matrices representing different
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2FIG. 1. Schematic representation of the four possible dilem-
mas available in the (T, S) space according to payoff matrix
A. We have: the Harmony Game (HG), the Hawk and Dove
(HD), the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), and the Stag Hunt (SH).
types of social dilemmas is
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with R = 1, P = 0, T ∈ [0, 2], and S ∈ [−1, 1] [33–35].
For example, when agent i cooperates (i.e., si = C) and
agent j defects (sj = D), the former gets payoff aCD = S,
and the latter gets aDC = T . Matrix A allows us to study
the following games: the Harmony Game (HG), the Stag
Hunt (SH), the Hawk and Dove (HD), and the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) (see Fig. 1 for the values of T and S corre-
sponding to each game); albeit in this study we focus on
the latter three. In each round, the total payoff for agent
i is given by pi(i) = 1N−1
∑N
j=1;j 6=i asisj . Once all agents
have played with all the others, an ordered pair (i, j) of
agents is selected uniformly at random to update their
strategies. Agent, i, with strategy X and payoff piX, will
adopt the strategy Y of agent j, with payoff piY, where
X,Y ∈ {C,D}, with a probability PX←Y specified by the
so-called Fermi rule [36, 37]:
PX←Y =
1
1 + e−β(piY−piX)
, (2)
where β ∈ [0,∞[ is an inverse temperature parameter,
which is also called the selection pressure. A large value
of β makes PX←Y more sensitive to the payoff difference,
piY−piX, corresponding to a strong selection pressure. Af-
ter the strategy updating, the round is completed. Then,
all agents reset their payoffs and play the next round.
The state of the system is determined by the fraction
of cooperative agents, fC = NC/N ∈ [0, 1], where NC
is the number of cooperators. The dynamics continues
until the system reaches one of its absorbing states, i.e.,
fC = {0, 1} [33, 38]. Committed individuals are modeled
as a new class of agents called zealots. A zealot always
cooperates and, is immune to strategy updating, while
other agents may still imitate her by becoming coopera-
tors.
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FIG. 2. Average fraction of cooperation among normal agents
in the stationary state, 〈fC〉, against the fraction of zealots,
fZ. We assume a well-mixed population and set N = 10
4 and
β = 10. We also consider the majority rule (MR) model with
a neighborhood’s size of five. The dashed line represents the
analytical result for the HD game in infinite populations (see
Appendix B 1 for details). For each fZ value, we average the
results over 50 different realizations. Shaded areas represent
the standard deviations.
III. RESULTS FOR WELL-MIXED
POPULATIONS
A. Agent-based simulations
To examine the extent to which a finite fraction of
committed cooperators triggers cooperation, we replace
a fraction fZ = NZ/N ∈ [0, 1/2] of normal agents with
zealots. Then, we measure the fraction of cooperators
among the normal agents, fC = NC/ [(1− fZ)N ], in the
stationary state. Figure 2 shows the average fraction of
cooperators in the stationary state, denoted by 〈fC〉, for
the HD, PD, and SH games for arbitrary choices of T and
S (see Appendix C 2 for a comprehensive exploration of
the (T, S) space).
Figure 2 indicates that fZ has little effect on 〈fC〉 for
the HD and PD games. However, for the SH game we
observe at fZ ≈ 0.15 a sharp transition from a state
where cooperation is sustained almost exclusively by
zealots (i.e., 〈fC〉 ≈ 0), to a fully cooperative state (i.e.,
〈fC〉 = 1), denoting the existence of a critical mass ef-
fect akin to the one observed for the majority rule opin-
ion model [13] and for other opinion dynamics models
[21, 22, 32]. In contrast, the lack of a critical mass effect
observed in the HD and PD games suggests the inability
of zealots to initiate a positive feedback mechanism en-
abling large-scale invasion of cooperators. Furthermore,
defectors end up exploiting zealots in the HD game, yield-
ing a reduction in fC as the fraction of zealots increases
[39]. This trend is consistent with the theoretical result
for infinite well-mixed populations, corresponding to the
dashed line in Fig. 2 (see Appendix B 1 for the details).
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FIG. 3. Phase portrait of the density of cooperators, fC, undergoing evolutionary dynamics in infinite populations. Each
column refers to a different dilemma: HD (panels a, d, and g), PD (b, e, and h), and SH (c, f, and i). We use the Fermi update
rule. Each row corresponds to a different selection pressure, namely: β = 100 (top), β = 10 (middle), and β = 1 (bottom).
B. Infinite-size populations
1. Methods and overall results
To address why zealots trigger the onset of coopera-
tion in the SH but not in the HD and PD games, we
study the evolutionary dynamics in terms of the concen-
tration of cooperators, fC, in the thermodynamic limit.
The following critical mass results are qualitatively the
same for finite populations (Fig. 6), as well as for the
so-called birth-death rule, which is equivalent to replica-
tor dynamics in infinite populations [38] (see Fig. 7 and
Appendix B 2 for details). Given an infinite population,
the evolutionary dynamics are described by
˙fC = PD→C − PC→D , (3)
where ˙fC denotes fC’s derivative with respect to time.
Quantity PX→Y is the probability per unit time that a
pair of agents having strategies X and Y is selected for
updating, and then agent with strategy X changes it to
Y. We have assumed that, the change of the strategy
obeys to the Fermi rule given by Eq. (2). Therefore, one
obtains
˙fC =
(1− fC)
(1 + fZ)
(
1 + eβα
)[(fC + fZ)eβα − fC] , (4)
where
α = piC−piD = 1
1 + fZ
[
(fC+fZ)(1−T )+(1−fC)S
]
, (5)
is the difference between the payoffs of a cooperator and
a defector.
We search then for the equilibria of the dynamics de-
scribed by Eq. (4), i.e., fC
? such that ˙fC
∣∣
fC=fC?
= 0.
This is effectively done in Fig. 3, where we plot ˙fC as a
function of fC (i.e., we draw the phase portrait) for the
three types of games and three selection pressure values,
β = {100, 10, 1}. The hue of the lines corresponds to dif-
ferent values of fZ including the case of zealots’ absence
(blue line). The solid square represents the fully coop-
erative absorbing state (fC = 1), and the other equilib-
ria correspond to the intersection(s) of the curves with
˙fC = 0 (dashed lines). We first observe that fC
? = 0
(i.e., absence of cooperation) exists if and only if zealots
are absent. Therefore, zealots induce a positive fraction,
which may be small, of cooperators among normal agents
(see Appendix B 1 for the proof). Second, equilibrium
fC
? = 1 (i.e., fully cooperative state) exists for any fZ
and is either unstable (HD and PD games) or stable (SH
game). Third, there is at most one intermediate solution,
γ = fZ exp(βα)/[1−exp(βα)], whose position depends on
the dilemma’s type, fZ, and the selection pressure, β. In
the following, we discuss the role of the selection pressure
β on the critical mass effect (if it exists) for each game.
2. HD game
In the HD game, for a strong selection pressure
(Fig. 3(a) and (d)), fC
? = γ is always stable, but its
position moves towards fC = 0 as fZ becomes larger
(in agreement with the results shown in Fig. 2). This
displacement is due to the fact that defectors exploit
4zealots thus helping defection to thrive. In this sense,
cooperative zealotry has a detrimental effect on coopera-
tion as the more zealots there are in the population, the
less cooperation we observe. Moreover, a stronger se-
lection pressure (Fig. 3(a)) exacerbates the exploitation
of cooperators compared to a milder selection pressure
(Fig. 3(d)).
For a weak selection pressure, the results are opposite
to those for stronger selection in the sense that fC
? = γ
moves towards fC = 1 (as opposed to fC = 0) as one
adds zealots (Fig. 3(g)). This means that reducing the
selection pressure reduces the effects of payoff difference,
α, making cooperation more appealing and boosting the
ability of zealots to trigger the emergence of cooperation.
3. PD game
In the PD game, the position of fC
? = γ is slightly
positive for strong levels of selection (Figs. 3(b) and (e)),
such that zealots induce some, albeit small, cooperation
in agreement with the observation made in Refs. [27, 28].
For a weak selection pressure, the equilibrium fC
? = γ
exists for any fZ > 0 and is stable (Fig. 3(h)). A reduced
selection pressure makes the payoff difference less rele-
vant, and fC
? = γ moves towards fC = 1 as fZ increases.
Nevertheless, we do not observe a critical mass effect.
4. SH game
In the SH game (Figs. 3(c), (f), and (i)), fC
? = γ is un-
stable when it exists, and the response to zealots is richer
than in the HD and PD games. Under a strong selection
pressure, we do not observe a critical mass effect. The
dynamics is bistable meaning that, depending on the ini-
tial condition, it attains one of the two stable equilibria
in which either C or D is the majority (Fig. 3(c)). This
dynamics is qualitatively the same as that for fZ = 0, in
which case the stable equilibria are located at fC
? = 0
and fC
? = 1, and the unstable equilibrium is located at
fC
? = γ = 1/2. However, as fZ increases, fC
? = γ moves
towards the left indicating that zealots make cooperation
more appealing, favoring the convergence to fC
? = 1. For
a mild selection pressure, β = 10, for fZ < fZ
? ≈ 0.4 the
dynamics remains bistable (Fig. 3(f)). This result is simi-
lar to that for β = 100. However, for fZ ≥ fZ? the system
undergoes a saddle-node bifurcation, through which the
left stable equilibrium and fC
? = γ coalesce and disap-
pear, leaving fC
? = 1 as the only equilibrium at fZ > fZ
?.
The saddle-node bifurcation confirms the existence of a
critical mass effect. We report an extensive exploration
of the (T, S) space in Fig. 8 of Appendix C 2. Finally, a
weak selection pressure, β = 1, reduces the critical mass
threshold, fZ
?, from ≈ 0.4 to ≈ 0.08 (Fig. 3(i)).
5. Summary
In a nutshell, reducing the selection pressure, β, does
not spawn a critical mass effect in the HD and PD games.
However, doing so still fosters higher levels of cooperation
in all the three types of games, and reduces the thresh-
old for the critical mass effect in terms of fZ in the SH
game. Moreover, reducing β attenuates the role of payoff
difference, α, on the fixation of cooperation, triggering
the shift of the intermediate equilibrium, γ. Although
zealots do not trigger the transition to full cooperation in
the HD and PD games, they elongate the transient time
needed to reach the equilibrium (Fig. 9 in Appendix C 2
and Ref. [29]). We also underline that, apart from the
selection pressure and game type, the critical mass effect
depends on the type of update rule. Under replicator dy-
namics, in fact, the critical mass effect with fZ
? = 0.3 ex-
ists regardless of whether the selection pressure is strong
or weak, and under all types of games (Fig. 7 in Ap-
pendix B 2).
IV. RESULTS IN NETWORK-BASED
POPULATIONS
It has been shown that the structure of the interac-
tions plays a pivotal role in the emergence of coopera-
tion [40, 41]. For this reason, we consider populations of
agents where the interactions among them are encoded
into a network. One of the main results of evolution-
ary games played on networks is that the heterogeneity
of the number of neighbors per agent (i.e., the degree)
favors the emergence of cooperation [34, 35]. To assess
whether the heterogeneity in the degree plays a role also
in the ability of zealots to trigger a critical mass effect,
we consider networks with an increasing level of degree
heterogeneity, i.e., the random regular lattice (REG),
the Erdo˝s-Reny´ı (ER), and Ba´rabasi-Albert (BA) net-
works [42–44]. In REG networks all agents have exactly
the same degree. Under this constraint, the edges are
uniformly randomly wired. In ER networks, the edges
are uniformly randomly wired under the condition that
the degree distribution is a Poisson distribution. Equiva-
lently, each pair of nodes is adjacent to each other by an
edge with a fixed probability, independently of the other
node pairs. Finally, in BA networks nodes are added one
at a time, and connections are established following the
so-called preferential attachment rule. In BA networks,
the degree is heterogeneously distributed and spans sev-
eral orders of magnitude: the degree distribution is a
power-law function. All networks have the same number
of nodes, N = 1000, and average degree, 〈k〉 = 6.
In Fig. 4, we report the fraction of cooperators among
normal agents in the three types of games for REG, ER,
and BA networks. Agents’ payoffs are computed accord-
ing to the so-called additive payoff scheme, i.e., the pay-
off of an agent i is pi(i) =
∑
j∈Ni asisj , where Ni is the
set of neighbors of i [35]. We have confirmed that the re-
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FIG. 4. Effect of zealotry on the emergence of cooperation on networks. We plot the average fraction of cooperators among
normal agents, 〈fC〉, against the fraction of zealots, fZ for (a) HD, (b) PD, and (c) SH. We used a Fermi update rule with
β = 10. We consider three types of networks, namely, random regular lattice (REG), Erdo˝s-Reny´ı (ER), and Baraba´si-Albert
networks (BA). We set N = 1000, and 〈k〉 = 6. In the BA networks, the size of the initial seed m0 = 3, and number of edges
added per step m = 3. The dashed line represents the analytical result for the HD game in finite populations (see Appendix A).
Results are averaged over 50 different realizations.
sults remain qualitatively the same for REG and ER also
when we normalize pi(i) by agent i’s degree (i.e., we use
the average payoff scheme), although this is not the case
of BA networks (see Appendix D for details). We con-
sider a fraction fZ of uniformly randomly selected nodes
to be zealots, whereas the other nodes are initialized as
defectors.
In the HD game, BA networks, but not the REG and
ER networks, attain almost full cooperation for fZ = 0,
which is in agreement with previous results [34, 45, 46].
An increase in fZ allows defectors to exploit normal coop-
erators regardless of the networks’ structure (Fig. 4(a)),
in agreement with results for well-mixed populations
(Fig. 2). In the PD game, BA networks display a clear
critical mass effect, with a sensible increase in coopera-
tion for fZ
? > 0.25. We set T = 1.5 and S = 0.5 such that
cooperation would be absent in the BA networks without
zealots. We find that the presence of zealots consider-
ably enhances cooperation in the PD game (Fig. 4(b)).
Such enhancement of cooperation confirms that degree
heterogeneity plays a crucial role in how zealots trigger
the emergence of cooperation. Finally, in the SH game
(Fig. 4(c)), the different structure of the network slightly
anticipates the transition to fC = 1 in terms of fZ, as
compared to the case of well-mixed populations. Our
extensive exploration of the (T, S) space supports the
generality of these results (Figs. 10 and 11).
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied how committed individ-
uals induce qualitative and quantitative changes in evolu-
tionary dynamics under different types of social dilemma.
We have considered three evolutionary dilemmas, and
observed that only the SH game displays a clear critical
mass effect, whereas in the other two dilemmas we need
to reduce the selection pressure, change the update rule,
or consider heterogeneous networks to observe a critical
mass effect. The presence of a critical mass in terms of
the fraction of zealots in the SH game is in line with
the observations made for other coordination dynamics
such as the majority rule model [13], the naming game
[22–24, 32], and the voter model [21].
Given our analytical underpinning, an experimental
validation of our findings involving populations of hu-
man subjects [47] – akin to the one done by Centola et
al. for the naming game [32] – would be desirable. On
the other hand, the extensions to evolutionary vaccina-
tion scenarios [48] where zealots contribute in part to
herd immunization and elicit defection, i.e., not taking
immunization, among normal agents (in agreement with
the phenomenology observed in the HD game) would be
straightforward. In the evolutionary synchronization dy-
namics based on the so-called evolutionary Kuramoto
dilemma [49] (which is akin to a coordination dynam-
ics), the existence of a critical mass – in analogy with the
SH game – is expected to enable the emergence of either
global or chimera synchronized states. Such states would
not be observed in the absence of zealots. Hence, the
addition of zealots to populations of evolutionary oscilla-
tors could be seen as the evolutionary analog of pinning
in control theory [50]. Our findings may also be use-
ful for understanding why zealots succeed in suppressing
oscillations in the rock-scissor-paper game [51], whether
or not a non-negligible fraction of zealots is required for
the emergence of collective coordination in human [20]
and animal [18] behavior, cooperative transport in ants
[19, 52], and cell migration [53]. For the latter two dy-
namics, an elongated correlation length plays a role on
coordination [19, 53] similar to a low selection pressure
in our framework. Further developments of the present
6work include studies of how tiny fractions of zealots may
affect the so-called fixation probability (i.e., the proba-
bility that the system ends up in the fully cooperative ab-
sorbing state) and the fixation time (i.e., the time needed
to reach the adsorbing state). Finally, we have consid-
ered only a random placement of zealots on the nodes of
the network. However, placing zealots on nodes ranked
according to their topological properties can reduce the
critical fraction of zealots needed to attain full consensus
[54].
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Appendix A: Evolutionary dynamics in finite
populations
In finite populations, we can study the onset of cooper-
ation under the presence of zealots using one-dimensional
random walks [29, 38, 56]. Let us consider a population
of size N = N ′ + z, where N ′ is the number of normal
agents, and z = fZN is the number of zealous agents.
Our goal is to study the evolution of the number of co-
operators among normal agents, NC ≡ i (0 ≤ i ≤ N ′),
given a fraction of zealots, fZ. For the payoff matrix
given by Eq. (1), the payoffs associated with cooperation
and defection are equal to
piC =
(i+ z − 1) + (N ′ − i)S
N − 1 (A1)
and
piD =
(i+ z)T
N − 1 , (A2)
respectively. The evolutionary dynamics is equivalent
to a one-dimensional random walk on a finite line whose
position is identified with the number of normal coop-
erators, 0 ≤ i ≤ N ′. Figure 5 shows the possible state
transitions in each strategy updating, where T−, T+, and
1−T+−T− are the probabilities that i decreases by one,
increases by one, and remains the same after a single
strategy updating, respectively. The probability that i
increases (decreases) by one is equal to the product of
the probability of choosing a pair of agents with different
strategies, Pch, and the probability that one of the agents
FIG. 5. Schematic representation of the possible transitions
that a finite population with i cooperators can undergo in one
step under evolutionary dynamics.
updates its strategy, PD←C (PC←D). By keeping in mind
that zealots do not update their strategy but can induce
defectors to become cooperators, under the Fermi rule
one obtains
T+ = Pch · PD←C = (i+ z) (N
′ − i)
N2
1
1 + e−β(piC−piD)
,
(A3)
T− = Pch · PC←D = i (N
′ − i)
N2
1
1 + e−β(piD−piC)
, (A4)
where we have used N(N −1) ' N2 assuming a large N .
Then, the bias in the random walk reads
T+ − T− = (i+ z) (N
′ − i)
N2
1
1 + e−β(piC−piD)
− i (N
′ − i)
N2
1
1 + e−β(piD−piC)
. (A5)
It is convenient to compute the payoff difference
α = piC − piD using Eqs. (A1) and (A2), yielding
α = piC − piD = (1− S − T ) i+ (1− T ) z + (N
′S − 1)
N − 1 .
(A6)
In terms of α, Eq. (A5) is rewritten as
T+ − T− = (N
′ − i) [(i+ z) eβα − i]
N2 [1 + eβα]
. (A7)
The equilibria of the evolutionary dynamics are the val-
ues of i? such that T+−T− = 0. Given Eq. (A7), finding
the equilibria is equivalent to finding the solutions of
(N ′ − i) [(i+ z) eβα − i] = 0 . (A8)
Therefore, i? = N ′, corresponding to the fully coopera-
tive state, is an equilibrium. To find other equilibria, we
start by rewriting the payoff difference, α, in terms of i
as follows
α =
(1− S − T ) i+ (1− T ) z + (N ′S − 1)
N − 1
=
λ1 + λ2 i
β
, (A9)
where
λ1 = β
(1− T ) z + (N ′S − 1)
N − 1 (A10)
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FIG. 6. Random walk’s bias, T+ − T− (Eq. (A7)), as a function of the number of cooperators among normal agents, i. Each
column accounts for a different dilemma, namely, HD (panels a, d, and g), PD (b, e, and h), and SH (c, f, and i). The hue
of the solid lines corresponds to the fraction of zealots, fZ, in the population, with the case without zealots being shown in
cyan. The square at i = N ′ represents the fully cooperative absorbing equilibrium, and the filling color denotes whether the
equilibrium is stable (black) or unstable (white). The results are for the Fermi update rule. Each row corresponds to a different
value of β, namely, β = 1 (top row), β = 10 (middle row), and β = 100 (bottom row). The population size is N = 105.
and
λ2 = β
1− S − T
N − 1 . (A11)
In terms of λ1 and λ2, we obtain
(i+ z) eβα− i = i (eλ1eλ2 i − 1)+z eλ1eλ2 i = 0 . (A12)
Therefore, i? = 0 is solution of Eq. (A12) if and only if
z = 0. This means that zealots always induce some co-
operation among normal agents. Furthermore, in agree-
ment with the behavior observed in absence of zealots for
SH and HD games, we expect to observe another equi-
librium 0 < i? < N ′. However, finding a closed-form
expression for such an equilibrium (i.e., the solution of
Eq. (A12)) is not easy because Eq. (A12) is a transcen-
dental equation. After identifying all the equilibria, we
examine their stability. Equilibrium i? = 1 is stable and
corresponds to full cooperation. Let us analyze the sta-
bility of other equilibria by focusing on the sign of the
random-walk bias given by Eq. (A7). The sign exclu-
sively depends on the numerator’s sign because the de-
nominator of Eq. (A7) is always positive. Specifically, we
examine whether
(N ′ − i)
≥0
[ Λ
(i+ z)
≥0
eβα
≥0
− i
≥0
]
≶ 0 . (A13)
Let us concentrate on the case Λ > 0, i.e.,
(i+ z) eβα > i . (A14)
By substituting Eq. (A9) into Eq. (A14) and taking the
logarithms of both sides, one obtains
λ1 + λ2 i > ln
(
i
i+ z
)
, (A15)
By substituting Eqs. (A10) and (A11) into Eq. (A15),
one obtains
β
1− S − T
N ′ + z − 1 i+ β
[
(1− T ) z + (N ′S − 1)
N ′ + z − 1
]
> ln
(
i
i+ z
)
.
(A16)
Similarly, Λ < 0 leads to
β
1− S − T
N ′ + z − 1 i+β
[
(1− T ) z + (N ′S − 1)
N ′ + z − 1
]
< ln
(
i
i+ z
)
.
(A17)
For i = 0, inequality (A16) always holds true. This con-
firms that i? = 0 is a reflective equilibrium and that
zealots always generate some cooperation.
In Fig. 6 we report T+ − T− given by Eq. (A7) as
a function of the number of cooperators among normal
agents, i, for three values of β, three types of game (i.e.,
HD, PD, and SH), and N = 105. Figure 6 suggests that
the results are qualitatively the same as those for the
infinite well-mixed populations reported in Figs. 3.
8Appendix B: Evolutionary dynamics in infinite
populations
In this section, we analyze infinite populations follow-
ing the approach introduced in Ref. [27]. We study the
dynamics of the fraction of cooperators among normal
agents, ˙fC, where the dot denotes the time derivative, as
a function of fC (i.e., we plot the phase portrait [57]),
when we introduce a fraction, fZ ≥ 0, of cooperative
zealots into the population. For strategy updating, we
consider the Fermi rule [37], and the replicator dynamics
[38].
1. Fermi rule
The average payoff of a cooperator, piC, and that of a
defector, piD, are given by
piC =
[
(fC + fZ) + (1− fC)S
]
1 + fZ
(B1)
and
piD =
(fC + fZ)T
1 + fZ
, (B2)
respectively. Thus
˙fC = T+ − T− = PD→C − PC→D , (B3)
where PX→Y is the joint probability that one selects a
pair of agents with strategies (X,Y) uniformly at random
and that the agent with strategy X adopts strategy Y
under the Fermi rule. These probabilities read
PD→C = (fC + fZ) (1− fC)
1 + fZ
1
1 + e−βα
, (B4)
PC→D = fC (1− fC)
1 + fZ
1
1 + eβα
, (B5)
where
α ≡ piC − piD = 1
1 + fZ
[
(1− T ) (fC + fZ) + (1− fC)S
]
.
(B6)
By substituting Eqs. (B4) and (B5) into Eq. (B3), one
obtains
˙fC =
1− fC
(1 + fZ) (1 + eβα)
[
(fC + fZ) e
βα − fC
]
. (B7)
At equilibrium, fC
? (i.e., ˙fC = 0), one obtains
fC
? = 1 or fC
? =
fZ e
βα
1− eβα . (B8)
In the absence of zealots (i.e., fZ = 0), we have two
equilibria fC
? = 0 and fC
? = 1. When fZ > 0, fC
? =
1 is still an equilibrium but fC
? = 0 is not, and it is
replaced by a new equilibrium located at 0 < fC
? < 1.
The behavior of ˙fC against fC for different values of β
and three types of dilemmas is displayed in Fig. 3.
2. Replicator dynamics
The replicator dynamics constitutes the infinite size
counterpart of the Moran rule [38, 58]. Under the Moran
process, we first select an agent called the child uniformly
at random among the normal agents. Second, we choose
an agent called the parent randomly with the probabil-
ity proportional to the agent’s payoff. Third, the parent’s
strategy replaces the child’s one. To ensure that the prob-
ability of choosing a parent is well-defined, payoffs must
always be positive. Since we have assumed S ∈ [−1, 1] for
the payoff matrix (Eq. (1)), S may be negative. There-
fore, we alter all entries of the payoff matrix by adding
to them a constant ε > 1 such that they are all positive.
This alteration preserves the type of dilemma. Therefore,
we use
A′′ =
C D
C
D
(
R′
T ′
S′
P ′
)
, (B9)
where R′ = 1 + ε, S′ = S + ε, T ′ = T + ε, P ′ = ε, and
ε > 1. For the payoff matrix given by Eq. (1), the payoff
of a cooperator is
pi′C =
(fC + fZ)R
′ + (1− fC)S′
1 + fZ
=
(fC + fZ)R+ (1− fC)S
1 + fZ
+
(1 + fZ) ε
1 + fZ
= piC + ε .
(B10)
Similarly, we get
pi′D =
(fC + fZ)T
′ + (1− fC)P ′
1 + fZ
= piD + ε , (B11)
where piC and piD are the payoffs computed using the
entries of the reduced payoff matrix (Eq. (1)).
One way to introduce selection pressure in the replica-
tor dynamics is to re-formulate the payoffs as follows
pi′C = 1− w + w piC , (B12)
pi′D = 1− w + w piD , (B13)
where w ∈ [0, 1] determines the intensity of selection.
The payoffs displayed in Eqs. (B10) and (B11), and those
in Eqs. (B12) and (B13) are equivalent with the iden-
tification w = 1/(1 + ε). Then, pi′C and pi
′
D shown in
Eqs. (B10) and (B11) are both (1 + ε) -times larger (cor-
responding to a change in the time scale without chang-
ing other aspects of replicator dynamics) than pi′C and
pi′D given by Eqs. (B12) and (B13). Since the condition
ε > 1 must hold to ensure that the Moran process is
well-defined, one must have w ∈ ] 0, 1/2 [. Using w as a
parameter to control the selection pressure and Eq. (1)
9as the payoff matrix, the payoffs are given by
piC = 1− w +
w
[
(fC + fZ)R+ (1− fC)S
]
1 + fZ
, (B14)
piD = 1− w +
w
[
(fC + fZ)T + (1− fC)P
]
1 + fZ
, (B15)
〈pi〉 = (fC + fZ)piC + (1− fC)piD , (B16)
where 〈pi〉 is the payoff averaged over all agents including
zealots. The probability of choosing a cooperator or a
defector as parent is given by
PC = (fC + fZ)piC〈pi〉 (B17)
and
PD = (1− fC)piD〈pi〉 , (B18)
respectively. The replicator dynamics is driven by the
difference between the rate at which defectors become
cooperators, T+, and the rate at which cooperators be-
come defectors, T−. Thus,
˙fC = T+ − T− = (1− fC)PC − fC PD . (B19)
The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (B19) rep-
resents the probability that a defector is chosen as child
and a cooperator as parent. The second term represents
the probability that a cooperator is chosen as child and a
defector as parent. By substituting Eqs. (B17) and (B18)
into Eq. (B19), one obtains
˙fC =
(1− fC)
〈pi〉
[
(fC + fZ)piC − fC piD
]
. (B20)
By substituting Eqs. (B14)–(B16) into Eq. (B20), we
obtain
˙fC =
(
1− fC
)(
fC + fZ
){
1− w + w
[
(fC + fZ)R+ (1− fC)S
]
1 + fZ
}
(
fC + fZ
){
1− w + w
[
(fC + fZ)R+ (1− fC)S
]
1 + fZ
}
− fC
{
1− w + w
[
(fC + fZ)T + (1− fC)P
]
1 + fZ
}
−
fC
(
1− fC
){
1− w + w
[
(fC + fZ)T + (1− fC)P
]
1 + fZ
}
(
fC + fZ
){
1− w + w
[
(fC + fZ)R+ (1− fC)S
]
1 + fZ
}
− fC
{
1− w + w
[
(fC + fZ)T + (1− fC)P
]
1 + fZ
} . (B21)
In Fig. 7, we show ˙fC versus fC for different values of fZ
in the case of the HD, PD, and SH games for three values
of selection pressure, w ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.49}. We observe
the presence of a critical mass effect in all the dilemmas
regardless of w.
One obtains the equilibria of the dynamics given by
Eq. (B21) by solving
(
1− fC
){{(
fC + fZ
){
1− w + w
[
(fC + fZ)R+ (1− fC)S
]
1 + fZ
}
− fC
{
1− w + w
[
(fC + fZ)T + (1− fC)P
]
1 + fZ
}}}
= 0 . (B22)
The solution fC = 1 corresponds to full cooperation. As
expected, this equilibrium exists regardless of the value
of, fZ, w, and the type of the game. The other solutions
of Eq. (B22) are the solutions of the following equation:
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FIG. 7. Phase portraits of the cooperators’ fraction, fC, under the replicator dynamics. Each row corresponds to a different
value of selection pressure, w, namely w = 0.1 (top), w = 0.3 (middle), and w = 0.49 (bottom). See the caption or Fig. 3 for
notations and legends.
(
fC + fZ
){
1− w + w
[
(fC + fZ)R+ (1− fC)S
]
1 + fZ
}
− fC
{
1− w + w
[
(fC + fZ)T + (1− fC)P
]
1 + fZ
}
= 0 . (B23)
Solving Eq. (B23) is not straightforward. However, we
can extract some useful information under specific con-
ditions. First, we verify whether fC = 0 is a solution of
Eq. (B23) or not. By setting fC = 0, one obtains
fZ
{
1− w + w
[
fZR+ S
]
1 + fZ
}
= 0 . (B24)
Equation (B24) has two solutions, i.e.,
fZ = 0 (B25)
and
1− w + w
[
fZR+ S
]
1 + fZ
= 0 . (B26)
The solution corresponding to Eq. (B25) tells us that
fC = 0 is a solution of Eq. (B22) only in the absence of
zealots, which is the same as the case of the Fermi rule.
Next, Eq. (B26) is equivalent to
fZ =
1 + w (S − 1)
w (1−R)− 1 . (B27)
The denominator is always negative. Therefore, fZ ≥ 0
requires that the numerator must be nonpositive, giving
w ≤ 1
1− S . (B28)
Inequality (B28) is always satisfied for S ∈ [−1, 1[, which
means that there exists a value fZ ≥ 0 such that there
exists a solution 0 < fC
? < 1 of Eq. (B22) regardless of
w.
Let us study now the effects of selection pressure, w,
on the solutions of Eq. (B23). In the zero selection limit,
Eq. (B23) becomes
fC + fZ = fC ⇐⇒ fZ = 0 . (B29)
Hence, in the zero selection limit, the only solutions to
˙fC = 0 apart from fC
? = 1 are those obtained in the
absence of zealots. The strong selection limit, w = 1, re-
turns a different scenario. By setting w = 1 in Eq. (B23)
one obtains
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(
fC + fZ
)[(fC + fZ)R+ (1− fC)S]
1 + fZ
= fC
[
(fC + fZ)T + (1− fC)P
]
1 + fZ
, (B30)
which leads to (
R− S − T + P )
A
fC
2 +
[
2fZR+ (1− fZ)S − fZT − P
]
B
fC +
(
fZ
2R+ fZS
)
C
= 0 . (B31)
The solutions of Eq. (B31) are fC
? = −B±
√
B2−4AC
2A .
Therefore, there are at most two other solutions to
Eq. (B22). There is no real solution fC
? if B2−4AC < 0,
which is the case if and only if fZ > f˜Z, if such an f˜Z ex-
ists. The value f˜Z corresponds to the critical mass of
zealots needed to observe only full cooperation. The val-
ues of f˜Z are displayed in Table I.
HD PD SH
R 1.0
P 0.0
T 3
2
3
2
1
2
S 1
2
−1
2
−1
2
ε 1.0408
f˜Z N/A 0.5 0.06
TABLE I. Minimum fraction of zealots, f˜Z, required to ob-
serve exclusively the full cooperative equilibrium (i.e., fC = 1)
for a replicator dynamics in the strong selection limit (i.e.,
w = 0.49).
Appendix C: Numerical results in mean-field
populations
1. Simulation setup
We provide here some details about the numerical im-
plementation of our agent-based simulations. Given a
population of N agents, we initialize the agents’ strate-
gies such that we have a fraction fZ of zealots. Then, we
start the evolutionary dynamics where, at each time step,
we first perform a uniform random sampling of Ng = 5N
pairs of agents and let them play and accumulate payoff
according to Eq. (1). In this way, each agent has played
ten times on average. Setting Ng = 5N yields a good
trade-off between having a sufficiently many games per
round played per agent, and keeping the overall compu-
tation time reasonably short. After agents accumulate
their payoff, they update their strategies, payoffs are re-
set to zero, and we measure the fraction of cooperators
among normal agents, fC, and begin a new round. We let
the dynamics to evolve for a transient of ttr time steps
during which we only store the value of fC. Then, for
t > ttr we evaluate the average, and standard deviation,
of fC over a moving window of length ttr. For PD and
SH games we expect that the dynamics ends in one of
its two adsorbing states: fC = 1 and fC = 0, respec-
tively. However, to expedite the computation, instead of
waiting until the system reaches the adsorbing state, we
let the evolution stop once 〈fC〉 > 0.95 (or 〈fC〉 < 0.05)
and σfC < 0.01 because we assume that the system is
then in a metastable state, and that it will reach the
adsorbing state for sure. In the case of the HD game,
we know that the stationary state is 0 < fC < 1 and
that it takes a lot of time to reach the stationariety. In
such case (or if the dynamics does not end up in any of
the aforementioned conditions), the dynamics stops after
tmax = 5 ·105 steps. Then, we compute 〈fC〉 over the last
ttr steps and use such value as the “final” value of coop-
eration. We remark that the aforementioned approach
corresponds to computing the intermediate equilibrium
point of the mean-field dynamics.
2. Exploration of the (T, S) space
In the main text, we focused on typical (T, S) values.
To examine the generality of our results in terms of T
and S, we numerically explore the (T, S) space in this
section. We set N = 1000 and β = 10. In Fig. 8 we show
the average fraction of cooperation among normal agents,
〈fC〉, as we vary T , S, and the fraction of zealots, fZ for
the Fermi update rule. The figure indicates that, for
the SH game, the transition from the equilibrium with
little cooperation to that with full cooperation occurs
suddenly as one increases fZ. Note that this is the case
for the entire parameter (T, S) region corresponding to
the SH game (i.e., T < 1 and S < 0). In contrast, for
the HD game, the effect of fZ is only little and gradual
in the entire parameter region (i.e., T > 1 and S > 0).
The results for the PD game (i.e., T > 1 and S < 0)
are mixed. In Fig. 9, we display the time needed for the
simulation to converge to the stationary state, 〈t?〉, and
its standard deviation, σt? .
12
0 1 2
T
-1
0
1
S
fZ = 0.01
0 1 2
T
-1
0
1
fZ = 0.05
0 1 2
T
-1
0
1
fZ = 0.10
0 1 2
T
-1
0
1
fZ = 0.25
0 1 2
T
-1
0
1
fZ = 0.40
0 1 2
T
-1
0
1
fZ = 0.50
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
〈
fC
〉
FIG. 8. Average fraction of cooperation among normal agents, 〈fC〉, for the considered (T, S) parameter region using the Fermi
update rule with β = 10. Each panel corresponds to a different value of fZ. Results are averaged over Nrep = 50 realizations
over a population of N = 1000 agents.
FIG. 9. (top) Average time needed to reach the stationary state, 〈t?〉, and (bottom) its standard deviation, σt? , in the (T, S)
parameter space used in Fig. 8 using the Fermi update rule with β = 10. Each panel corresponds to a different value of fZ.
Results are averaged over Nrep = 50 realizations over a population of N = 1000 agents.
Appendix D: Numerical results for networks
We have also tested the effect of zealotry on networks
for various values of T and S. The degree distribution is
a delta function for REG networks, a Poisson distribu-
tion for ER networks, and a power law for BA networks
[44]. Moreover, to exclude any other effect than those
associated with degree heterogeneity, we fix the number
of nodes, N = 1000, and the average degree, 〈k〉 = 6, to
be the same for the three types of networks. It is worth
noting that degree heterogeneity may boost cooperation
[34, 35], or decrease it when a cost is associated with each
interaction [59]. For this reason, we consider two scenar-
ios: one in which we divide the payoff accumulated by
each agent by its degree (i.e., number of connections) to
suppress the effect of degree heterogeneity, and another
in which we do not carry out the division. The former
approach is known as average payoff scheme [60], while
the other is usually called additive payoff scheme [35].
Figure 10 shows the fraction of cooperators for the dif-
ferent networks under the additive payoff scheme. A tiny
fraction of zealots is enough to spur almost complete co-
operation in the HD game when played on a BA net-
work. However, in agreement with the results for the
well-mixed populations, an excessive fraction of zealots
decreases the fraction of normal cooperators, making de-
fection more appealing as shown by the re-emergence of
defection in the upper right corner of the (T, S) space.
Moreover, BA networks considerably increase the coop-
eration in the PD game, albeit such phenomenon occurs
only when fZ > 0.25. The SH game, instead, does not
display any remarkable difference with the phenomenol-
ogy observed in well-mixed populations.
In contrast to the case of additive payoff scheme, un-
der the average payoff scheme the amount of cooperation
over the (T, S) space does not remarkably depend on the
network structure. Figure 11 shows the average fraction
of cooperators, 〈fC〉, for different values of T and S, dif-
ferent network structures, and the average payoff scheme.
As expected, the pattern of cooperation is roughly inde-
pendent of the network structure, although ER and BA
networks slightly promote cooperation compared to the
well-mixed populations in an extensive part of the (T, S)
space corresponding to the PD game for fZ ≥ 0.25.
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FIG. 10. Average fraction of cooperators among normal agents, 〈fC〉, in the (T, S) space for different networks in the additive
payoff scheme. The first, second, and third rows correspond to random regular lattice (REG), Erdo˝s-Reny´ı (ER) networks, and
Ba´rabasi-Albert (BA) networks, respectively. Each column accounts for a different fraction of zealots, fZ. We set N = 1000
nodes and 〈k〉 = 6. We use the Fermi update rule with β = 10. Results are averaged over Nrep = 50 different realizations.
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FIG. 11. Fraction of cooperators among normal agents, 〈fC〉, for networks in the (T, S) space for the average payoff scheme.
The first, second, and third rows correspond to random regular lattice (REG), Erdo˝s-Reny´ı (ER) networks, and Ba´rabasi-Albert
(BA) networks, respectively. Each column accounts for a different fraction of zealots, fZ. Each network has N = 1000 nodes
and 〈k〉 = 6. We use the Fermi update rule with β = 10. Results are averaged over Nrep = 50 different realizations.
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